Local Prosecutors' Inherent Conflict of Interest

The takeaway from the grand jury decision in Ferguson is not the guilt or innocence of the cop who shot Michael Brown. It's that local officials cannot be trusted to oversee the prosecution of the actions of their local police departments.

By most accounts Bob McCulloch, the St. Louis Country prosecutor who "presented" the Brown case to the grand jury, sounded more like a defense attorney trying to exonerate the cop who shot Brown.

McCulloch was especially unqualified to bring the case: he has a personal history that should have immediately caused him to recuse himself in the case. Among the reasons -- and there were many -- his father was killed by a black suspect while on a police call.

Local district attorneys and prosecutors have an inherent conflict of interest when it comes to investigating their own police departments.

And it's not just McCulloch. Some demanded McCulloch appoint a special prosecutor, but that wouldn't cut it. Local district attorneys and prosecutors have an inherent conflict of interest when it comes to investigating their own police departments. They have to work with cops every day. They depend on them for apprehending suspects, gathering evidence, testifying in court, and sometimes for protection from vengeful criminals. A prosecutor who pisses off the police department is dead meat, figuratively and sometimes literally.

The cops are an important part of the local power hierarchy, and they get a lot of privileges and get cut a lot of slack.

For example, you may recall how Scott Walker blamed public sector unions for all Wisconsin's woes a few years ago. He emasculated teacher and other unions by eliminating collective bargaining. But police unions were exempted.

Why? Because Walker needs the police on his side. When a governor or DA or mayor pisses off  their own police force the cops start pulling stupid crap, like the ones who accused the mayor of Minneapolis of using gang signs (#pointergate).

That's why local and state government should be out of the picture when deciding whether to prosecute police misconduct. The FBI and the U.S. Attorney's office should automatically have jurisdiction whenever cops shoot civilians or are accused of other crimes.

It shouldn't be Internal Affairs, or the DA from the next county over, or the state's attorney general. It should be the FBI. Now, the FBI ain't perfect. But they don't have an inherent conflict of interest like all the local power brokers do.

Federal jurisdiction of police misconduct protects everyone involved: DAs and mayors would avoid bad blood with their cops. Cops would know they're not being hounded over some local political vendetta. And the public would know that the local DA isn't whitewashing the crimes of their pals on the police force.

In many of these cases the feds eventually get involved anyway. In the Rodney King case there were huge riots in LA after the jury acquitted or deadlocked on the excessive force charges. But two of the four cops later went to prison for violating King's civil rights.

Might as well eliminate the middle man.